A martingale approach to the question of fiscal stimulus by Ernst, Philip A. et al.
A martingale approach to the question of fiscal
stimulus
Philip A. Ernst∗, Michael B. Imerman†, Larry Shepp‡, and Quan Zhou§
April 5, 2019
Abstract
Democrats in the United States argue that government spending
can be used to “grease the wheels” of the economy to create wealth
and to increase employment; Republicans contend that government
spending is wasteful and discourages investment, thereby increasing
unemployment. These arguments cannot both be correct, but both
arguments seem meritorious. Faced with this paradox, one might
hope that a rigorous mathematical approach might help determine the
truth. We address this economic question of fiscal stimulus as a new
optimal control problem generalizing the model of Dutta and Radner
[1999]. We find that there exists an optimal strategy and provide
rigorous verification proof for the optimality. Further, we prove a few
interesting mathematical properties of our solution, providing deeper
insight into this important politico-economic debate and illustrating
how the fiscal stimulus from the government may affect the profit-
taking behavior of firms in the private sector.
1 Introduction
The purpose of the present manuscript is to mathematically model optimal
fiscal policy with the hopes of contributing to the ongoing debate between
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Democrats and Republicans on what measures should be taken to stimulate
the economy. Although our original motivation for the present manuscript
was to examine the question of taxation (should taxes be raised or lowered to
reduce unemployment?), we instead succeed in formulating a rigorous mathe-
matical model for government spending; taxes are still implicitly considered,
but the control variable is how much – if at all – should the government inject
into the private sector to improve the economic state variable wealth1. We
can and do reach a firm conclusion with a reasonable model which turns out
to favor the democratic side by showing that if the government injects money
into the private sector, it will increase wealth enough, at least on average, to
cover the expenditures which can then be recovered through taxation.
This would appear to settle the issue, at least for a mathematician, that
truth lies on the democratic side. However, there is one important subtlety:
if a company is free to take its profits in its own way so as to maximize its
time discounted total dividends, then the conclusion reached above becomes
false in the sense that there are some profitable companies where, if the
company can set its own rule for taking dividends, the additional profit may
not be enough to provide the old profits, or the company may even fail
to pay the expected discounted loan cost. Thus, in order to obtain the
advantage promised by the democratic side, the government would need to
become intimately involved in the companies’ internal decision makings. This
weakens the conclusion in favor of the democrats if the greater society is not
in favor of taking the freedom away from companies to use their own plan
for profit taking.
The strategy needed to obtain sufficient wealth to pay for the mean dis-
counted loans necessarily involves government control of how and when the
company takes its profits. The answer to the question of whether or not
mathematics can settle the debate of the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus then
comes down to deciding whether society is willing to give up freedom of the
company to set its profit-taking the way it wants and to accept some govern-
1Fiscal policy refers to the budgetary decisions that the Government makes regarding
revenue (via taxation) and expenditures (via spending). Politics plays as much if not more
of a role than economics in fiscal policy, as evidenced by the seemingly endless quarreling
between Democrats and Republicans. We summarize both sides’ arguments here in the
introduction, but also note that there is a rich economics literature on the topic with highly
regarded economists justifying their respective sides. The contribution of the present work
is to provide a rigorous mathematical framework using martingale theory to re-examine
the issue.
2
ment interference. This decision is not included in our mathematical model,
and it would appear not to be easily included in any mathematical model.
Indeed, this decision does not belong to mathematics.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the seminal
work of Dutta and Radner [1999], which can be viewed as a baseline model
where the government does not offer any loans to companies. Other related
works are also briefly reviewed in Section 2.2. In Section 3 we propose our
new model where the expected profit rate of a company can be increased
by borrowing money from the government. We shall rigorously prove in
Section 4 that the government’s providing of loans to a company produces
additional net profit.2 Our model can also be used to mathematically analyze
the behavior of “greedy” companies which do not care about repaying the
government loans. Some theoretical results concerning such greedy behavior
are provided in Section 4 and numerical studies are performed in Section 5.
Rigorous verification arguments are give in Section 6.
2 Background
The purpose of the present section is to provide the requisite background for
our new model in Section 3.
2.1 The model of Dutta and Radner [1999]
We follow Dutta and Radner [1999] and suppose that a company can be
characterized by 4 parameters, (x, µ, σ, r), the present worth, x, the profit
rate, µ, the riskiness, σ, and the prevailing interest rate, r. It is presumed
2This would tend to lend credence to the Democrats’ plan which is to stimulate the
economy by injecting capital into the private sector rather than cutting taxes. The Re-
publican mathematician may question the model as being flawed, and perhaps there is;
and this “flaw” may be the restriction that the company must follow closely the optimum
policy in order to increase its profits enough to cover the cost of the loan. A reasonable
alternate policy (which gives higher profits to the firm) fails to achieve cost-coverage in
many cases; would the government be wise enough to grease the right companies? Since it
has no “self-interest”, maybe not. The Democrat mathematician may respond that rather
than a “flaw” the conclusion is the result of a subtlety in the model, a semantic difference –
the company may have an obligation to follow the socially optimal policy (especially since
it has taken the government money). After all, this is what happened after the banks, and
other systemically important firms (for example, General Motors), received investments
from the U.S. government during the 2008 Financial Crisis and the Great Recession.
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that the objective of the firm is to maximize discounted total profit, and also
that the company chooses its policy optimally.
Dutta and Radner [1999] formulated the following model for the dynamics
of the wealth of the company:
dX(t) = µdt+ σdW (t)− dZ(t), t ≥ 0;
X(0−) = x, W (0) = 0, Z(0−) = 0, (1)
where X(t) is the fortune of the company at time t, W is a standard Brow-
nian motion representing uncertainty and risk, and Z(t) is the total profit
(dividends) (which subtract from the fortune) taken up to time t. Z(t) is
assumed to be a nondecreasing, nonanticipating and ca`dla`g (right continu-
ous with left limits) process. In particular, Z(0) is allowed to be positive.
Dutta and Radner [1999] assumed that the company chooses Z optimally to
maximize the expected value of time-discounted profit without knowing the
future of W , i.e., the market conditions. The company’s worth is given by
V¯ (x) = V¯ (x;µ, σ, r) = sup
Z: dZ/dt≥0,
∆Z(t)≤X(t−)
[
Z(0) +
∫ τ0
0
e−rtdZ(t)
]
, (2)
where r > 0 is the discounting parameter and
τ0 = τ
X
0 = inf{t : X(t) ≤ 0},
is the time that the company goes bankrupt. For convenience, we will also
use the notation ∫ τ0
0−
e−rtdZ(t) = Z(0) +
∫ τ0
0
e−rtdZ(t).
The stipulation of Dutta and Radner [1999] that ∆Z(t) = Z(t) − Z(t−) ≤
X(t−) means that the company cannot make a lump-sum dividend payment
greater than its current fortune. The definition immediately implies that
V¯ (0) = 0. Further V¯ (x) ≥ x since one strategy for taking profit is to take
the fortune immediately (“take the money and run”); bankruptcy occurs at
time τ0 = 0+. One notes that X depends upon Z and Z also depends upon
X, which is somewhat paradoxical and requires an existence proof that there
is a pair (X,Z) with this relationship, for every admissible strategy, Z, of
profit taking. The standard way around this difficulty is to take the supre-
mum over all Ω-space realizations of the pair of processes (X,Z).
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A final point worth noting is that the Dutta–Radner choice of additive
rather than multiplicative Brownian motion is an old and well-discussed is-
sue, see Radner and Shepp [1996, p. 1390], where it is shown that inside a
Samuelson–Black–Scholes multiplicative model the company either becomes
infinitely rich (µ > r) or V¯ (x) ≡ x (“take the money and run”); i.e. it was
shown that the multiplicative Brownian motion setup would not represent
observed real-world behavior within the context of these types of models.
2.2 Solution to the Dutta–Radner model
As argued in Dutta and Radner [1999], when a dividend payment of amount
dZ is made, the net change in the value function is dZ(1 − V¯ ′(x)). Hence
when V¯ ′(x) > 1, dZ should be zero; when V¯ ′(x) ≤ 1, dZ should be as large
as possible. Hence, if the value function V¯ is concave, the optimal strategy,
denoted by Z¯(t), should be a barrier payout process such that dZ¯/dt = 0 or
∞ according as X(t) < a¯ or x > a¯ for some a¯ ≥ 0. More precisely,
Z¯(t) = sup {max{X(s)− a¯, 0} : 0 ≤ s ≤ t} .
Assuming V¯ ∈ C2, one may solve the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
max{LV (x), 1− V¯ ′(x)} = 0, L = −r + µ∗ ∂
∂x
+
σ2
2
∂2
∂x2
,
with the initial condition V¯ (0) = 0 to obtain the solution
V¯ (x) =
eγ+x − eγ−x
γ+eγ+a¯ − γ−eγ−a¯ , 0 ≤ x ≤ a¯,
V¯ (x) =
eγ+a¯ − eγ−a¯
γ+eγ+a¯ − γ−eγ−a¯ + (x− a¯), a¯ ≤ x <∞,
(3)
where γ+, γ− are the roots of the indicial equation,
γ± =
−µ±√µ2 + 2rσ2
σ2
.
The optimal threshold a¯ can be most easily determined by the smooth-fit
heuristic, V¯ ′′(a¯) = 0, which yields
a¯ = a¯(µ, σ, r) =
{ 1
γ+−γ− log (
γ−
γ+
)2, if µ ≥ 0,
0, if µ < 0.
(4)
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Using standard verification techniques, one can prove that the above solution
is the true value function and the policy Z¯ with reflection barrier a¯ is indeed
the optimal dividend payout policy.
The above result was first found by Dutta and Radner [1999]3, who further
showed that the company that follows the optimal policy will go bankrupt in
a finite time with probability 1. The same model was considered at the same
time by Radner and Shepp [1996], Jeanblanc-Picque´ and Shiryaev [1995]
and Asmussen and Taksar [1997], who also derived the optimal strategy of
dividend payouts under various constraints on the payout rate. Both Dutta
and Radner [1999] and Radner and Shepp [1996] also allow (µ, σ) to be part
of the control, and Radner and Shepp [1996] found which specific value to use
at any given value of X(t) = x, among {(µi, σi) : i = 1, 2, . . . , }. The solution
gave rise to some surprising results, for example that if the company is nearly
bankrupt then it should be very conservative and use the (µi, σi) pair with
the smallest σi which seems to be paradoxical to many economists; see the
work of Sheth et al. [2011]. For simplicity in discussing the present question
we will limit the company to only one corporate direction, i.e. n = 1.
Many variants of the Dutta–Radner model have also been proposed in the
literature. For example, Choulli et al. [2003] assume that the control consists
of two parts, one being the dividend payout process and the other affecting
both the profit rate (drift) and the riskiness of the underlying fortune process.
De´camps and Villeneuve [2007] extended the Dutta–Radner model to include
a singular control process representing an investment. Recently, De Angelis
and Ekstro¨m [2017] found the optimal policy for the finite horizon case.
Other related works include Jgaard and Taksar [1999] and Asmussen et al.
[2000].
2.3 Further insights into the Dutta–Radner model
From (4), we see that if µ < 0, then a¯ = 0 and V¯ (x, µ, σ, r) ≡ x, i.e. it is
always optimal to take the money and run. However, if µ > 0, the company
is profitable, and then a¯(µ, σ, r) > 0; the threshold a¯ goes to zero as µ ↓ 0 or
as µ ↑ ∞ (see the left panel of Figure 1). Note that the optimal solution is
of the form that the company takes profit only when it is “rich”, i.e., when
3According to Radner and Shepp [1996], the model was first proposed and solved by
Dutta and Radner in an earlier manuscript in 1994.
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X(t) ≥ a¯. We also point out for later use that if µ ≥ 0,
V¯ (a¯) =
eγ+a¯ − eγ−a¯
γ+eγ+a¯ − γ−eγ−a¯ =
γ+ + γ−
γ+γ−
=
µ
r
. (5)
We conclude this section by offering some further observations that, to
the best of our knowledge, are not currently stated in the literature. When
a suboptimal reflecting barrier a is used, the formula (3) is still applicable
with a¯ replaced by a. That is, if we let
Za(t) = sup {max{X(s)− a, 0} : 0 ≤ s ≤ t} , (6)
denote a dividend payout policy which chooses to always pay out whatever
amount that exceeds a constant threshold a > 0, then the expected time-
discounted profit, denoted by V (a), can be calculated as
Va(x;µ, σ, r) = Ex
∫ τ0
0−
e−rtdZa(t) =

eγ+x − eγ−x
γ+eγ+a − γ−eγ−a , x ∈ [0, a],
Va(a) + (x− a), x > a.
(7)
To prove this, one only needs to verify that Va satisfies LV (x) = 0 for x ∈
[0, a], Va(0) = 0 and V
′
a(a) = 1, and then may apply the argument we use
in the Step 1 of the verification proof provided in Section 6.1 of the present
work (see also Remark 2.) The mapping a 7→ Va(x) is always maximized at
a = a¯ for any x ≥ 0 since a¯ represents the optimal policy which maximizes
the expected time-discounted profit (see the right panel of Figure 1 below).
3 Our new model: “greasing the wheels” with
fiscal stimulus
The new model we shall consider generalizes that of Dutta and Radner [1999].
The government will provide funds to the company through a direct loan,
allowing it to receive up to a maximum rate, until bankruptcy. One might
hope that there are some companies for which the expected additional profit
from having the government funds is greater than the expected cost of the
stimulus until bankruptcy. Indeed, we shall see in Section 4 that for every
7
Figure 1: The Dutta–Radner model with r = 0.05 and σ = 0.3. The left
panel plots the curves a¯(µ, σ, r) and V¯ (x;µ, σ, r) with x = 0.5 and µ ranging
from 0 to 3. Note that in this example a¯ is maximized at µ = 0.143. In
the right panel, we fix µ = 0.1 and plot the expected profit Va against the
reflecting barrier a. For any x, Va(x) is maximized at a = a¯ = 1.200.
profitable company, the increased profit covers the loan, provided the com-
pany takes profits (dividends) in an optimal way to maximize its presumed
objective. This is the main result of the present paper.
Following the notation of Dutta and Radner [1999], we will assume that
µ > 0, i.e., the company is profitable. To study the effect of fiscal stimulus, we
shall consider the “greasing the wheels” argument of the Democrats. Suppose
the government subsidizes the firm to put it in a better position and thereby
increases the company’s µ to µ∗. This might be done by a direct subsidy or
by infrastructure improvements. The fiscal stimulus may be modelled as a
government loan that injects cash into a given firm increasing their expected
profit (µ to µ∗) that is to be paid back at interest rate r.4 That is, the
company may be supplied any amount less than or equal to (µ∗ − µ)dt in
each interval dt, where µ∗ ≥ µ. The company may then choose an operating
level at which to take profits. It may choose the Dutta–Radner optimal level
a∗ = a¯(µ∗, σ, r) where a¯ is as defined in (4) with µ∗ in place of µ, but if it
4In a recent paper in the economics literature by Lucas [2016], it is also shown that
government loans and subsidies to private firms can be an effective means of fiscal stimulus.
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chooses this “greedy” or “socially-undesirable” strategy then the expected
additional profit may not cover the expected loan cost. However, as we shall
see, the company can do better, indeed so much better that it will always
provide enough money to cover both the loan cost and provide the old profit.
Henceforth we shall call a company “socially acceptable” if it meets the
“socially acceptable” goal of covering the loan cost as well as, on average,
providing the original profit.
To find a socially acceptable policy under borrowing from the govern-
ment, suppose the company’s worth at time t is again X(t), which satisfies
the stochastic differential equation in (1). Unlike in the Dutta–Radner for-
mulation, we shall now allow borrowing; that is, dZ/dt ≥ −(µ∗ − µ) instead
of dZ/dt ≥ 0. This means the firm can borrow at a limited rate, or, take
negative dividends. As in Dutta and Radner [1999], we shall continue to
require that ∆Z(t) = Z(t) − Z(t−) ≤ X(t−) for any t ≥ 0. The problem
is now to maximize the mean discounted profit and to find the new value of
the firm, defined as
V ∗(x) = V ∗(x, µ, µ∗, σ, r) = sup
Z: ∆Z(t)≤X(t−),
dZ
dt
≥−(µ∗−µ)
Ex
∫ τ0
0−
e−rtdZ(t), (8)
where the sup is taken over all admissible choices of Z which are nonantici-
pating and ca´dla´g with the derivative now allowed to be negative but which
must be at least as large as −(µ∗ − µ). The negative increments of Z count
negatively in computing the profit earned by the company. Note that any
policy Z can be written in the following form
Z(t) = Z+(t)− Z−(t), Z+(0−) = Z−(0−) = 0,
where Z+(t) represents the total dividends issued up to time t, which may
be taxed, and Z−(t) is the total loans issued up to time t. Hence, we require
Z±(t) ≥ 0 for any t and both Z+ and Z− are nondecreasing and nonantici-
pating processes. In addition, Z− is assumed to be in C1 with derivative
dZ−(t)
dt
≤ c = µ∗ − µ.
Let A denote the set of all possible processes (Z+, Z−) that satisfy the above
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conditions. We may now reformulate our stochastic control problem as
dX(t) = µdt+ σdW (t) + dZ−(t)− dZ+(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ τ0;
X(0−) = x, Z−(0) = 0, Z+(0−) = 0;
V ∗(x, µ, µ∗, σ, r) = sup
(Z+,Z−)∈A
Ex
∫ τ0
0−
e−rt[dZ+(t)− dZ−(t)],
(9)
where we recall bankruptcy occurs at τ0.
The company will earn at least as much profit as in the Dutta–Radner
case, since by choosing Z−(t) ≡ 0, we obtain
V ∗(x, µ, µ∗, σ, r) ≥ sup
(Z+,Z−)∈A, Z−≡0
Ex
∫ τ0
0−
e−rt[dZ+(t)− dZ−(t)]
= V ∗(x, µ, µ, σ, r) = V¯ (x, µ, σ, r).
(10)
A similar argument reveals that, for any µ′ ∈ [µ, µ∗), we have
V ∗(x, µ, µ∗, σ, r) ≥ V ∗(x, µ, µ′, σ, r).
We conclude this section with a brief discussion of our model. In some
sense, we have chosen the model with a built-in advantage for the democratic
side. On the other hand, society regularly objects to outsize profits taken
by executives of money-losing companies. Perhaps a company that wants
the loan (under which it makes more money) might be willing to agree to
conditions on how and when it takes its profits. This appears credible and
to justify the investment of the money provided. In Section 4, we will find
the optimal strategy under the loan. We will show in Theorem 1 that the
company should always take the loan at the maximum rate, and it should
again issue profits at a threshold which is always lower than the threshold
for the company with profit rate µ∗ (see Proposition 2.)
4 Calculation of the optimal expected profit
minus loan cost
In this section, we calculate the value function defined in (9). Just like in
Dutta and Radner [1999], the optimal dividend payout control increases in
local time, but now at a different threshold, aˆ, and under optimal control
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we show that the company continuously borrows at the maximum possible
rate, c = µ∗ − µ. Taking dividends in local time appears complicated but
the thesis of Liu [2004] shows that if dividends are required to be lump-sum
payments rather than “dribs and drabs,” nearly the same total profit values
are obtained.
We now state the main result of this paper.
Theorem 1 (verification). Let the function Vˆ ∈ C2 and aˆ ≥ 0 be the solution
to the free-boundary problem,
L∗Vˆ (x) = c, x ∈ [0, aˆ],
Vˆ (0) = 0,
Vˆ ′(x) = 1, x ∈ [aˆ,∞),
Vˆ ′′(x) = 0, x ∈ [aˆ,∞),
where c = µ∗ − µ ≥ 0 and
L∗ = −r + µ∗ ∂
∂x
+
σ2
2
∂2
∂x2
. (11)
Then Vˆ (x) = V ∗(x), the solution to the new optimization problem given
in (9). Let Zˆ = (Zˆ+, Zˆ−) be the optimal policy and Xˆ be the corresponding
fortune process. Then Zˆ−(t) = ct and (Xˆ, Zˆ+) is the solution to the stochastic
differential equation
Xˆ(t) = x+ µ∗t+ σW (t)− Zˆ+(t), Zˆ+(t) =
∫ t
0
I(Xˆ(s) = aˆ)dZˆ+(s).
The proof is given in Section 6.1. The solution for Vˆ (x) = Vˆ (x, µ, µ∗, σ, r)
is
Vˆ (x) = A+(e
γ∗+x − 1) + A−(eγ∗−x − 1), x ∈ [0, aˆ], (12)
Vˆ (x) = Vˆ (aˆ) + (x− aˆ), x ∈ [aˆ,∞), (13)
where γ∗± now goes with µ
∗, i.e.,
γ∗± =
−µ∗ ±√(µ∗)2 + 2rσ2
σ2
,
quite analogous to γ± in the simpler Dutta–Radner problem, and constants
A+ =
−γ∗−e−γ∗+aˆ
γ∗+(γ∗+ − γ∗−)
, A− =
γ∗+e
−γ∗−aˆ
γ∗−(γ∗+ − γ∗−)
.
11
The barrier aˆ is now only implicitly defined as the root of the equation,
(−γ∗−)e−γ∗+a
(γ∗+)(γ∗+ − γ∗−)
− (γ
∗
+)e
−γ∗−a
(−γ∗−)(γ∗+ − γ∗−)
− c
r
= 0. (14)
This optimal threshold, aˆ, in our new model does not have an analytical
solution, unlike in the original model where it is known in closed form. The
following proposition guarantees that, given µ > 0, there always exists an
appropriate solution with aˆ > 0 to the free-boundary problem in Theorem 1.
Proposition 1. Assume µ > 0 and µ∗ ≥ µ. The free-boundary problem in
Theorem 1 has a unique solution (Vˆ , aˆ) such that Vˆ ∈ C2 and aˆ > 0.
Proof. We only need to verify that (14) has only one solution and it is posi-
tive. Denote the left-hand side of (14) by f(a). It is straightforward to verify
that f is monotone decreasing, f(0) = µ/r > 0, and f(∞) = −∞. So there
is one and only one root on (0,∞).
From (10), we already know that V ∗(x, µ, µ∗, σ, r) ≥ V¯ (x, µ, σ, r); that is,
by borrowing money from the government, the company is able to make a net
profit at least as large as in the Dutta–Radner model without government
loans. Now we prove that, as long as the optimal policy is used, the company
can make a strictly larger expected net profit. Further, the more money a
company can borrow from the government, the (strictly) larger expected net
profit it can make.
Theorem 2. Consider two pairs of drift parameters (µ1, µ
∗
1) and (µ2, µ
∗
2).
(i) If µ1 = µ2 = µ and µ
∗
1 > µ
∗
2 ≥ µ, then for any x > 0,
V ∗(x, µ, µ∗1, σ, r) > V
∗(x, µ, µ∗2, σ, r).
(ii) If µ∗1 = µ
∗
2 = µ
∗ and µ2 < µ1 ≤ µ∗, then for any x > 0,
V ∗(x, µ1, µ∗, σ, r) > V ∗(x, µ2, µ∗, σ, r).
Proof. The proof for part (i) relies on the verification techniques used for
proving Theorem 1 and requires the result of Proposition 2. Hence, the
proof for this part is put in Section 6.2.
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To prove part (ii), first notice that
V ∗(x, µ2, µ∗, σ, r) = E2x
[∫ τ0
0−
e−rtdZaˆ2(t)−
∫ τ0
0−
(µ∗ − µ2)e−rtdt
]
,
where aˆ2 = aˆ(µ2, µ
∗, σ, r) and Zaˆ2 denotes a dividend payout policy with
reflection barrier aˆ2. Clearly, for another company characterized by the five-
tuple (x, µ1, µ
∗, σ, r), it can also use the policy Zaˆ2 to make dividend payments
but borrow money at rate µ∗ − µ1. Hence,
V ∗(x, µ1, µ∗, σ, r) ≥ E1x
[∫ τ0
0−
e−rtdZaˆ2(t)−
∫ τ0
0−
(µ∗ − µ1)e−rtdt
]
,
and, when the policy on the right-hand side is used, X(t) evolves according
to
X(t) = x+ µ∗t+ σW (t)− Zaˆ2(t).
Therefore, the expectations E1x and E
2
x can be evaluated with respect to the
same probability measure. Given any x > 0, we have τ0 > 0 under the
above policy and thus the claim follows from the strict inequality µ∗ − µ1 <
µ∗ − µ2.
We will compare the optimal threshold aˆ with two other suboptimal
choices:
a¯ = a¯(µ, σ, r) = aˆ(µ, µ, σ, r),
a∗ = a¯(µ∗, σ, r) = aˆ(µ∗, µ∗, σ, r).
(15)
The threshold a¯ is defined in (4), which is the optimal threshold for the Dutt–
Radner model where borrowing is not allowed. The threshold a∗ represents
a greedy strategy which only wants to maximize the dividend payouts and
does not care about repaying the loan. We first prove that the new threshold
aˆ is always less than the old Dutta–Radner threshold a¯. This is a second key
result of our model. An immediate consequence is that since aˆ ∈ (0, a¯), aˆ
can be computed numerically using a standard one-dimensional optimization
algorithm.
Proposition 2. Assume µ > 0 and µ∗ ≥ µ. Then aˆ = aˆ(µ, µ∗, σ, r) ≤
a¯(µ, σ, r) = a¯ where a¯ is the optimal threshold of the Dutta–Radner model.
Further, if µ∗1 > µ
∗
2 ≥ µ, then we have the strict inequality
aˆ(µ, µ∗1, σ, r) < aˆ(µ, µ
∗
2, σ, r).
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Proof. Recall that in (5) we showed V¯ (a) = V¯ (a) = µ/r . Now we note also
that V ∗(aˆ) = Vˆ (aˆ) = µ/r due to (14). But for any x, V ∗(x) ≥ V¯ (x), because
V ∗ is the supremum over a larger class of admissible policies. Further, both
V¯ (x) and V ∗(x) are monotone increasing in x. Hence the fact V¯ (a) = V ∗(aˆ)
implies aˆ ≤ a.
To prove the strict inequality, again let f(a) denote the left-hand side
of (14) and consider the mapping µ∗ 7→ f ′(a;µ∗) where f ′ denotes the deriva-
tive with respect to a. Routine but heavy calculation gives
∂f ′(a;µ∗)
∂µ∗
= − rσ
2e−γ
∗
+a
[(µ∗)2 + 2rσ2]3/2
{
1 + h(µ∗) + e2h(µ
∗)(h(µ∗)− 1)} ,
where h(µ∗) = aσ−2
√
(µ∗)2 + 2rσ2. By computing the first and second
derivatives, one can verify that h 7→ 1 + h + e2h(h − 1) is always positive
on (0,∞). Hence, for any a > 0, µ∗ 7→ f ′(a;µ∗) is monotone decreasing. Re-
call that f(0) = µ/r > 0 and f is monotone decreasing in a. Since for a larger
µ∗, f(a;µ∗) decreases at a higher rate, we conclude that µ∗ 7→ aˆ(µ, µ∗, σ, r)
is also monotone decreasing.
The greedy company only wants to maximize the dividend payout and
does not care about repaying the loan. Then the problem reduces to the
Dutta–Radner model and the company should choose the threshold a∗ de-
fined in (15). We now prove in Proposition 3 below that a∗ is always greater
than aˆ given µ∗ > µ > 0. Hence, in the absence of being held accountable,
the firm taking the loan will pay out dividends later. This is not surpris-
ing from a mathematical perspective. When we compare the Dutta–Radner
model with drift µ∗ with our new model with drift parameters µ and µ∗, the
only difference is the objective function, and the additional loan cost in our
model can be interpreted as a penalization on the “lifetime” of the company;
without this penalty term, the firm wants to live longer and thus the dividend
payout threshold is increased.
Proposition 3. Let a∗ = a¯(µ∗, σ, r) be the optimal threshold of the Dutta–
Radner model with profit rate µ∗. Then a∗ > aˆ(µ, µ∗, σ, r) if µ∗ > µ > 0.
More generally, if µ∗ ≥ µ1 > µ2, then we have
aˆ(µ1, µ
∗, σ, r) > aˆ(µ2, µ∗, σ, r).
Proof. We only need to prove the general claim since a∗ = aˆ(µ∗, µ∗, σ, r) is a
special case. Recall that, for any µ ≤ µ∗, aˆ(µ, µ∗, σ, r) is the solution to (14),
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and the left-hand side of (14), f(a), is monotone decreasing in a. But observe
that in (14), only c = µ∗ − µ depends on µ and
c1 = µ
∗ − µ1 < µ∗ − µ2 = c2.
Since c only affects the vertical shift, but not the shape, of the function f(a),
we conclude that aˆ(µ1, µ
∗, σ, r) > aˆ(µ2, µ∗, σ, r).
In our model, the net profit of a company can be written as the difference
of two components:
Ex
∫ τ0(a)
0−
e−rtdZ(t) = Ex
∫ τ0(a)
0−
e−rtdZ+(t)− Ex
∫ τ0(a)
0−
e−rtdZ−(t).
The first component is the positive dividend payouts to the firm, and the
second is the cost of the loans (discounted). Now consider a policy denoted
by Z∗a which chooses to always borrow the money at the maximum rate c and
pays out whatever amount that exceeds a constant threshold a > 0. Then
the expected values of the time discounted total dividend payout and the
cost of the loan can be written as
Da(x;µ
∗, σ, r) = Ex
∫ τ0(a)
0−
e−rtdLa(t), Ca(x;µ, µ∗, σ, r) = Ex
∫ τ0(a)
0
ce−rtdt,
where τ0(a) is the first time to hit zero of the process Xa, a Brownian motion
with a reflecting barrier at a, and La is its local time at level a:
Xa(t) = x+ µ
∗t+ σW (t)− La(t), La(t) =
∫ t
0
I(Xa(s) = a)dLa(s). (16)
The process La(t) is the same as Za(t) defined in (6). Notice that Da does
not depend on µ and we already know how to compute Da from Section 2:
Da(x;µ
∗, σ, r) = Va(x;µ∗, σ, r),
where Va is given in (7). Let Dˆ = Daˆ and Cˆ = Caˆ denote the above two
components when the optimal policy Zˆ is applied; thus Cˆ = Vˆ − Dˆ. See the
left panel of Figure 2 below for a numerical example.
The time-discounted mean cost of the loan with an arbitrary reflecting
barrier a can be computed as
Ca(x) =
c
r
[1− g(x)] , g(x) = Ex
[
e−rτ0(a)
]
.
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The calculation of the function g relies on the key observation that g(Xa(t))e
−rt
is a martingale [c.f. Darling and Siegert, 1953, Lehoczky, 1977, Ernst et al.,
2018]. By Itoˆ calculus, the martingale property implies that g′(a) = 0 and
L∗g(x) = 0 for x ∈ [0, a] where the operator L∗ is defined in (11). Another
boundary condition is given by the fact that g(0) = 1. The solution is given
in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Let τ0(a) be the first time to hit zero of the process Xa(t)
defined in (16). Then,
g(x;µ, µ∗, σ, r) = Ex e−rτ0(a) =
γ∗−e
−γ∗+(a−x) − γ∗+e−γ∗−(a−x)
γ∗−e
−γ∗+a − γ∗+e−γ∗−a
,
which is the solution to the differential equation L∗g(x) = 0 with boundary
conditions g′(a) = 0 and g(0) = 1.
Proof. Using Itoˆ calculus and the fact that L∗g(x) = 0 and g′(a) = 0, we
have
de−rtg(Xa(t)) = σe−rtg′(Xa(t))dWt.
Integrating from 0 to τ0(a), taking expectation and using g(0) = 1, we obtain
Exe
−rτ0(a) − g(x) = Ex
∫ τ0(a)
0
σe−rtg′(Xa(t))dWt.
For any t ∈ [0, τ0(a)], clearly g′(Xa(t)) is bounded since Xa(t) ∈ [0, a]. Hence,
the integral on the right-hand side is zero, which completes the proof.
Now for a strategy Z∗a with reflecting barrier a > 0, the expected net
profit can be computed as
V ∗a (x;µ, µ
∗, σ, r) = Da(x;µ∗, σ, r)− Ca(x;µ, µ∗, σ, r)
= Va(x;µ
∗, σ, r)− c
r
[1− g(x;µ, µ∗, σ, r)]. (17)
In particular, for a greedy firm which uses the threshold a∗, we also have
Da(x;µ
∗, σ, r) = V¯ (x;µ∗, σ, r). The mapping a 7→ V ∗a (x) is maximized at
a = aˆ. The numerical example provided in the right panel of Figure 2
illustrates how the three functions V ∗a , Da, Ca change with a.
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Figure 2: Our new model with µ = 0.1, r = 0.05 and σ = 0.3. The
left panel plots the curves aˆ(µ, µ∗, σ, r), Vˆ (x;µ, µ∗, σ, r), Dˆ(x;µ∗, σ, r) and
Cˆ(x;µ, µ∗, σ, r) with x = 0.5 and µ∗ ranging from 0.1 to 0.3. In the right
panel, we fix µ∗ = 0.15, x = 1 and plot the expected net profit V ∗a , the
expected dividend payout Da, and the expected loan cost Ca against the re-
flecting barrier a. V ∗a (x) is maximized at a = aˆ = 1.099 and Da is maximized
at a = a∗ = 1.257.
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5 Discussion
The Democratic policy of greasing the wheels through fiscal stimulus promises
to bring benefit to all. Indeed, if it were true that government loans to some
profitable firms would increase the rate of income to the point that the in-
creased profit would pay for itself in expectation then, as the Democrats
have been arguing, this extra money could be used to supplement taxes and
the extra capital above the cost of the loans could be used in many ways,
including creating jobs. Indeed, our new model in Section 4 confirms this
hypothesis, provided that loans are made to profitable companies who follow
the socially acceptable policy.
Unfortunately, if the company uses the Dutta–Radner policy with µ∗ in
place of µ, this will lead to choosing a dividend threshold which is not aˆ, the
one for the socially acceptable policy of maximizing Vˆ (x). The expected net
profit of this company would be V ∗a∗ , which can be computed using (17). If
µ∗ > µ, the expected total dividend payout, Da(x;µ∗, σ, r) = V¯ (x;µ∗, σ, r), is
always greater than V¯ (x;µ, σ, r), the maximum total dividend payout with-
out borrowing money, which is the primary motivation behind such a greedy
strategy. To better understand the consequences of this strategy, we herein
investigate the following two questions.
(i) Is it true that the expected net profit, V ∗a∗(x;µ, µ
∗, σ, r), is greater than
or equal to V¯ (x;µ, σ, r)? If not, it means that the company would be
foolish to be greedy, since it is likely to obtain a higher expected net
profit by not borrowing any money from the government.
(ii) Is it true that the expected total dividend payout, V¯ (x;µ∗, σ, r), is
greater than or equal to the expected loan cost, Ca(x;µ, µ
∗, σ, r)? If
not, this implies that it could be dangerous of the government to lend
money to some firms since they may not even be able to repay the loan
(in expectation).
We performed various numerical experiments and found that the answer
to both questions to be “not necessarily.” For the first question, we need µ
to be relatively large compared to r for the statement to be true. In Figure 3,
we give a numerical example of two different companies. The interest rate is
r = 0.05; the profit rate µ = 0.08 for Company 1 and µ = 0.06 for Company
2. For Company 1, V ∗a∗(x;µ, µ
∗, σ, r) keeps increasing as µ∗ increases, which
means the the more money it can borrow, the larger net profit it can make
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by using the greedy reflecting barrier a∗. However, for Company 2, the curve
has a different shape. Indeed, when no money is borrowed, Company 2 has
V¯ (1) = 1.24. But if µ∗ = 0.16 (which corresponds to the borrowing rate
c = 0.1) and it uses a∗, then V ∗a∗(1) drops to 1.17.
For the second question, numerics show that the firms with greedy poli-
cies are usually able to repay the loan unless both µ and x are very small.
For a concrete example, let µ = 0.055, σ = 0.1, r = 0.05 and x = 0.05.
Numerics show that when µ∗ > 0.34, the expected total dividend payout of
a greedy firm cannot cover the expected loan cost and thus the net profit
would be negative. Although such bad cases are very rare, it may be better
if the government can step in to ensure that the “correct” dividend policy is
utilized, or the government might try to recognize which companies would
be in the “good” class where the increased profits will pay for the loan. We
leave the question of how to tell which companies are good in this sense to
future research.
Figure 3: Behavior of the “greedy” companies with r = 0.05 and x = 1. We
plot the net profit when a greedy policy is used, V ∗a∗(x;µ, µ
∗, σ, r), against the
parameter µ∗. The first company is characterized by µ = 0.08 and σ = 0.3,
while the second has µ = 0.06 and σ = 0.3.
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6 Proofs
6.1 Proof for Theorem 1
The verification consists of two steps. First, we need to check that Vˆ (x) is
indeed the expected value of the time-discounted profit when we apply the
optimal control function (Zˆ+, Zˆ−). Second, we need to prove that no other
policy can do better. The latter requires the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The solution Vˆ given in (12) and (13) satisfies Vˆ ′(x) ≥ 1 and
L∗Vˆ (x) ≤ c for any x ≥ 0. Consequently, the following Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation holds:
max{L∗Vˆ (x)− c, 1− Vˆ (x)} = 0, ∀x ≥ 0.
Proof. We first show that Vˆ ′′(x) ≤ 0 for any x ≥ 0. By the expression of Vˆ
given in (12) and (13), this is equivalent to proving that, for any x ∈ [0, aˆ],
A+(γ
∗
+)
2e(γ
∗
+−γ∗−)x ≤ −A−(γ∗−)2. (18)
Since by definition γ∗+ > 0 and γ
∗
− < 0, we only need show (18) holds true for
x = aˆ. But we already know that V ′′(aˆ) = 0 and thus A+(γ∗+)
2e(γ
∗
+−γ∗−)aˆ =
−A−(γ∗−)2. Hence we conclude Vˆ ′′(x) ≤ 0.
Since Vˆ ′(aˆ) = 1 for any x ≥ aˆ, the non-positivity of Vˆ ′′ implies that
Vˆ ′(x) ≥ 1 for any x ≥ 0. To prove L∗Vˆ (x) ≤ c, notice that Vˆ (x) >
Vˆ (aˆ), Vˆ ′(x) = Vˆ ′(aˆ), Vˆ ′′(x) = Vˆ ′′(aˆ) for any x > aˆ. The claim then fol-
lows from the condition that L∗Vˆ (aˆ) = c.
Remark 1. The smooth-fit condition, Vˆ ′′(aˆ) = 0, is critical in the above
proof. Assume all the other conditions in Theorem 1 are satisfied. Now
if Vˆ ′′(aˆ−) > 0, then Vˆ ′(aˆ − ) < 1 for some  > 0 since Vˆ ′(aˆ) = 1. If
Vˆ ′′(aˆ−) < 0, one can show that L∗Vˆ (aˆ+) > c, since there is a jump increase
in Vˆ ′′(x) at x = aˆ and L∗Vˆ (aˆ−) = c. Therefore, the smooth-fit condition is
necessary for the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation to hold true.
Now we present our verification proof.
Step 1. Consider the case x ∈ [0, aˆ]. The process Zˆ+(t) is the local
time of the process Xˆ at the level aˆ and thus it is continuous, nondecreas-
ing, nonanticipating and adapted. Note that such a pair (Xˆ, Zˆ+) always
exists [Karatzas and Shreve, 1998, Chap. 3.6].
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Define αt = τ
Xˆ
0 ∧ t and consider the process e−rαtVˆ (Xˆ(αt)). By Itoˆ’s
formula, we have
e−rαtVˆ (Xˆ(αt))
= Vˆ (x) +
∫ αt
0
e−rsL∗Vˆ (Xˆ(s))ds+
∫ αt
0
e−rsVˆ ′(Xˆ(s))
[
σdW (s)− dZˆ+(s)
]
.
For any s ∈ [0, τ Xˆ0 ], we always have Xˆ(s) ∈ [0, aˆ] and thus L∗Vˆ (Xˆ(s)) = c
and Vˆ ′(Xˆ(s)) stay bounded. Hence, the integral with respect to dW is zero.
Taking expectation on both sides we obtain
Ex e
−rαtVˆ (Xˆ(αt)) = Vˆ (x) + c
∫ αt
0
e−rsds− Ex
∫ αt
0
e−rsdZˆ+(s), (19)
where we have also used the fact that dZˆ+(t) = 0 if Xˆ(t) 6= aˆ and Vˆ ′(aˆ) = 1.
Next we claim that
lim
t→∞
Ex e
−rαtVˆ (Xˆ(αt)) = 0. (20)
If the bankruptcy happens, i.e. τ Xˆ0 < ∞, then Vˆ (Xˆ(t)) = 0 for any t ≥
τ Xˆ0 ; if τ
Xˆ
0 = ∞, notice that Vˆ (Xˆ(t)) always stays bounded and e−rαt → 0.
Hence, we obtain (20). Letting t → ∞ in (19) and applying the monotone
convergence theorem to the integral with respect to dZˆ+, we obtain that
Vˆ (x) = Ex
∫ τX0
0−
e−rt
[
dZˆ+(t)− dZˆ−(t)
]
. (21)
In particular, we have established the equality (21) for x = aˆ, which, together
with the expression of Vˆ given in (13), can be used to easily show that (21)
also holds for x ∈ (aˆ,∞).
Remark 2. The smooth-fit condition, Vˆ ′′(aˆ) = 0, is not used in Step 1. Now
one can easily verify that the function V ∗a given in (17) is the solution to the
ordinary differential equation
L∗v(x) = c, x ∈ [0, a],
with boundary conditions v(0) = 0, v′(a) = 1. Hence, the above argument
also proves that V ∗a is indeed the expected net profit of the policy Z
∗
a which
pays the dividend using policy Za(t) defined in (6) and borrows money at a
constant rate c.
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Step 2. For any admissible policy Z = (Z+, Z−), let
V (x;Z) = Ex
∫ τ0(X)
0−
e−rt [dZ+(t)− dZ−(t)]
be the expected value of the time-discounted profit. We need to show that
V (x;Z) ≤ Vˆ (x). By assumption, Z− is a continuous process but Z+ is not
necessarily. So we let Zc+ be the continuous part of Z+. The dynamics of the
process X are given by (9). We apply Itoˆ’s formula to obtain
Vˆ (x) = −
∫ t∧τX0
0
σe−rsVˆ ′(X(s))dW (s) + I1 + I2 − I3 + I4 (22)
where
I1 =
∫ t∧τX0
0
e−rs
[
Vˆ ′(X(s))(−dZ−(s) + c ds)− L∗Vˆ (X(s))ds
]
,
I2 =
∫ t∧τX0
0
e−rsVˆ ′(X(s))dZc+(s),
I3 =
∑
0≤s≤(t∧τX0 )
e−rs
{
Vˆ (X(s))− Vˆ (X(s−))
}
,
I4 = e
−r(τX0 ∧t)Vˆ (X(t)).
(23)
From Lemma 1, we have Vˆ ′(x) ≥ 1 and L∗Vˆ (x) ≤ c. Moreover, by
assumption −dZ−(s) + c ds ≥ 0. Therefore, we obtain
I1 ≥
∫ t∧τX0
0
e−rs [−dZ−(s) + c ds− c ds] = −
∫ t∧τX0
0
e−rsdZ−(s)
and
I2 ≥
∫ t∧τX0
0
e−rsdZc+(s).
Further, Vˆ ′(x) ≥ 1 also implies that
I3 ≤ −
∑
0≤s≤(t∧τX0 )
e−rs∆Z+(s),
22
where we have used the fact that X(s) − X(s−) = −(Z+(s) − Z+(s−)).
Taking expectation on both sides of (22) and using the boundedness of Vˆ ′,
we get
Vˆ (x) ≥ Ex
∫ t∧τX0
0−
e−rs [dZ+(s)− dZ−(s)] ,
since clearly I4 ≥ 0. Finally by letting t → ∞, we obtain the inequality
V (x;Z) ≤ Vˆ (x), which completes the proof.
6.2 Proof for Theorem 2 (i)
The value function V ∗(x, µ, µ∗2, σ, r) is attained by a policy where money is
borrowed at rate µ∗2 − µ and dividend payments are made at a barrier
b = aˆ(µ, µ∗2, σ, r).
We let Zb denote this dividend payout policy which is defined in (6), and use
Zˆ2(t) = Zb(t)− (µ∗2 − µ)t,
to denote the full control function. Clearly Zˆ2(t) is also admissible to a
company characterized by (x, µ, µ∗1, σ, r) since µ
∗
1 > µ
∗
2, and we want to show
that for any x > 0
Vˆ (x, µ, µ∗1, σ, r) > V (x, µ, µ
∗
1, σ, r; Zˆ2).
Recall that by (22) in the verification proof, we have
Vˆ (x, µ, µ∗1, σ, r) ≥ Ex (I1 + I2 − I3) ,
where I1, I2, I3 are defined in (23). Now all we need to show is that, when
Z = Zˆ2, we have the strict inequality
I1 + I2 − I3 >
∫ t∧τX0
0−
e−rsdZˆ2(s) =
∫ t∧τX0
0−
e−rs [dZb(s)− (µ∗2 − µ)ds] .
Recall that Vˆ (x) = Vˆ (x;µ, µ∗1, σ, r) is the solution to the free-boundary
problem described in Theorem 1 and the boundary solution is given by
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aˆ = aˆ(µ, µ∗1, σ, r), which is smaller than b by Proposition 2. Using Lemma 1,
one can verify that
L∗1Vˆ (x;µ, µ∗1, σ, r) < c, x ∈ (aˆ, b],
Vˆ ′(x;µ, µ∗1, σ, r) > 1, x ∈ (0, aˆ),
Vˆ ′(x;µ, µ∗1, σ, r) = 1, x = b,
where
L∗1 = −r + µ∗1
∂
∂x
+
σ2
2
∂2
∂x2
.
Further, when Z = Zˆ2, we have
−dZ−(s) + cds = −(µ∗2 − µ)ds+ (µ∗1 − µ)ds = (µ∗1 − µ∗2)ds > 0,
which implies that for any x ∈ (0, aˆ) ∪ (aˆ, b],
Vˆ ′(x;µ, µ∗1, σ, r)(−dZ−(s) + c ds)− L∗1Vˆ (x)ds > −dZ−(s) = −(µ∗2 − µ)ds.
The Lebesgue measure of the set {0 ≤ s ≤ τX0 : X(s) = aˆ} is zero. Hence,
when Z = Zˆ2 is applied and X(t) starts from x > 0, we have, with probability
1,
I1 =
∫ t∧τX0
0
e−rs
[
Vˆ ′(X(s))(−dZ−(s) + c ds)− L∗Vˆ (X(s))ds
]
1{X(s)6=aˆ}
>
∫ t∧τX0
0−
−e−rs(µ∗2 − µ)ds.
Note that we have the equality
I2 − I3 =
∫ t∧τX0
0−
e−rsdZb(s).
By the same arguments used in the verification proof, we conclude that
Vˆ (x, µ, µ∗1, σ, r) ≥ Ex(I1 + I2 − I3) > Ex
∫ t∧τX0
0−
e−rsdZˆ2(s) = Vˆ (x, µ, µ∗2, σ, r).
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